

# Mars Sample Return – The Earth Return Orbiter Securing Mars

SpaceTech Masters Symposium

Edrich Yau, 23/07/2021, ESA/ESTEC,

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### Why Mars and what has Security got to do with it?



Half the radius of Earth, so Gravity is much lessFurther from the sun so colder (-10 deg C at the warmest day)No magnetic core so no protection from radiation from the Sun2.7AU from Earth at the max separation distance

Are we seriously worried about an Alien attack? It is totally ridiculous!



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### What is there on Mars?

Mariner 4 images looked disappointing

But Hubble showed an atmosphere,

- Clouds

- Seasons

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# **Dynamic landscape**





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### Mars Express Satellite imagery





Echus Chasma 100km long and 10km wide. May have channelled water https://www.esa.int/Science\_Exploration/Space\_Science/Mars\_Express/Echus\_Chasma

# Echus Chasma



# Mars Sample Return Campaign

The Trilogy has already begun!

- Perseverance & Ingenuity (30 July 2020) now at Jezero Crater
- Sample Return Lander & Sample Fetch Rover (2026)
- Earth Return Orbiter (2026)

### Returning Martian Samples to Earth









### **Overview of the spacecraft**





Approx 6.5 Tonnes (wet mass)
Solar Array = 39m x 6.6m
41 kW (at Earth BoL)
4 Electrical Propulsion thrusters
2 separate Chemical Propulsion systems

100W TWTA with 2.3m Main Dish (HGA)
 Supports 250kbps at 2.2AU
 Triple redundant TTC system
 4 OnBoard Computers & security modules
 UHF comms for Mars Relay

### **ERO Staging**





CCRS and Rendezvous Sensor Suite CCRS Total (w/o RSS) $\approx$  500 kg EES  $\approx$  100 kg CCM > 200 kg (Jettisoned at Mars) OS  $\approx$  8 kg

### Main Module ("Return Stage")

Dry Mass = 2200 kg Electric Propulsion: 3 x active + 1 spare Thrust Range = 0.13 – 0.75 N Isp = 4000s Xenon Mass = 1100 kg Delta-V = 10 km/s

### Orbit Insertion Module ("Drop Stage")

Jettisoned at Mars Dry Mass = 600 kg Prop Mass = 1900 kg



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Communications support activities

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![](_page_11_Figure_1.jpeg)

In-bound return trip to Earth + Earth Avoidance Manoeuvre

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# But still,...Why Security ???

![](_page_12_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_12_Picture_2.jpeg)

### Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) Planetary Protection Policy

![](_page_12_Picture_4.jpeg)

- \* "To protect the space environment from "harmful contamination" which would endanger the integrity of the scientific exploration of outer space including the search for life."
- "Most importantly, it also helps to preserve the terrestrial biosphere from possible contamination by extraterrestrial material"
- Predates the Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967)

## **Security Assurance Needs Overview**

NASA Cesa

- Unclassified mission
- Return of Bio-Contained Sample
- CAT-V Backward Planetary Protection Mission
- Export Controlled Items (Dual use technology)
- Landing in Utah Test and Training Range
- Mission Success
- Agency Reputation

![](_page_13_Picture_9.jpeg)

![](_page_13_Picture_10.jpeg)

![](_page_13_Picture_11.jpeg)

![](_page_13_Picture_12.jpeg)

### **Satellite Hacking**

![](_page_14_Picture_1.jpeg)

### > US DOD event Satellite DEFCON Ethical Hackers

- 2011 US-German ROSAT (<u>NASA Computers Hacked By Intruders Via Satellite -</u> (<u>satellitetoday.com</u>)
  - 2007-8 Landsat-7 & EOS AM-1 (Hackers Interfered With 2 US Government Satellites | Space)
- > 2021 Ransomware attacks
   > Identity or technology theft
   > Director by the first or the first or
- Private data and information

![](_page_14_Figure_7.jpeg)

# **Applied Security Process**

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- We don't have an ECSS for this (yet) ! But ... Consultive Committee for Space Data Systems CCSDS 350.1-G-2 (Security Threats against Space Missions) helps
- 1. Initiated an over-arching Security Working Group (now includes ADS Prime)
- 2. Established key stakeholder concerns (e.g. NASA/JPL, ESOC) => Risk Appetite/Profile
- 3. Considered which adversaries are in/out of scope
- 4. Elaborated a High level Threat & Vulnerability Assessment
- 5. Completed Space Segment detailed Security Risk Analysis
- 6. Piggybacking Security through existing ESA standards and processes (dependability, Testing philosophy, industrial ISMS)

![](_page_15_Picture_9.jpeg)

## Take Away Messages

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- Security can help but can hinder : understand why you want it!
- Understand your stake holders needs and recognise your assets
- Who are you protecting it from?
- Focus your security level at the appropriate threshold
- Think (just a little bit) about the security from the beginning

![](_page_16_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Figure_8.jpeg)

![](_page_17_Picture_0.jpeg)

# Thank You

**Questions?** 

AIRBUS

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